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*I.C.C.L.R. 289  Introduction  
Where a collective investment scheme ceases to operate with a substantial shortfall in 
funds owing to the beneficiaries under the scheme, the question arises as to how that fund 
should be distributed. There are a number of possible ways in which the distribution can be 
made. First, the most obvious solution is for the funds to be distributed to the beneficiaries 
pari passu to the respective contributions made by the beneficiaries. Secondly, given the 
fact that the funds would have been the subject to mixing in a bank account, the so-called 
rule in Clayton's Case could apply.1 This rule, often described as the “first in, first out” rule, 
simply lays down that the first payment into the account is presumed to be the first 
payment out. The remaining balance of the funds is to be distributed to those beneficiaries 
whose funds were paid into the account much later on and have not been exhausted. The 
rule is one that is not without controversy and there has been much judicial and academic 
debate as to its proper application in modern trust law. Finally, a solution used in North 
America, which is to have a rolling charge over the fund. The High Court in Russell-Cooke 
Trust Co v Prentis2 has recently had the opportunity to decide which of these three 
methods of distribution should be applied to the collapse of an investment scheme with 
funds owing to a substantial number of contributors. In doing so it has once again 
highlighted the inadequacies of applying the rule in Clayton's Case in the modern law. 
 The facts  
The facts concerned an investment scheme run by a solicitor, which in June 2000 ceased to 
operate as a result of intervention by the Law Society, with substantial shortfalls in the 
funds owed to the contributors. Custodian trustees were appointed and the question was 
how should the remaining funds be distributed amongst the contributors under the 
scheme? The investment scheme was called the “Secured Property Investment Plan” (the 
SPIP) and worked on the following premises. The plan offered investors a fixed rate 15 per 
cent per annum return on sums invested. Monies received by the solicitor were paid into 
the solicitor client account called the “Prentis no.2 client account”.3 The money (belonging 
to more than one investor) was then to be loaned to a borrower by way of a charge over his 
property at an interest rate of 15 per cent per annum. Save in one case, the investors were 
not consulted on matters relating to the type of property over which the loans were being 
made by the solicitor operating the scheme. As and when interest had become due it was 
paid into the “Prentis no.3 client account”, which was intended as the account to be used to 
pay the investors the sums due to them under the plan. 
The plan attracted some £6 million by way of investment. However, subsequently a 
number of irregularities had been found in the conduct of the operation of the SPIP. There 
was no co-relation between interest received or deducted in advance from a particular 
borrower *I.C.C.L.R. 290  and interest paid to an investor or investors to whom a charge 
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from that borrower had been allocated. Neither Mr Prentis nor his firm kept a cashbook for 
any of the relevant bank accounts or a complete list of investors. There were substantial 
shortfalls in both income and capital to meet the claims of individual investors. It was 
established there was a shortfall of some £3.66 million in the fund needed to meet the 
claims of the investors. On June 2, 2000 the Law Society intervened and Mr Prentis was 
struck off the roll of solicitors of the Supreme Court. The consequence of this was that Mr 
Prentis and his firm were incapacitated from acting as trustees in relation to trusts 
conducted by them. By instructions of the Court, Russell-Cooke Trust Co, a custodian 
trustee, was appointed to control the assets of the SPIP scheme. 
 The legal issues in relation to SPIP  
There were three main legal issues for the court to resolve in Russell-Cooke Trust Co v 
Prentis. First, how many invested schemes did the SPIP create? Secondly, were any of 
these investment schemes “collective investment schemes” within the meaning of s.75 of 
the Financial Services Act?4 Finally, who were the beneficial owners of the Prentis no.2 
client account? It is the last of these three questions which is of most relevance in this 
article. However, the Court did resolve the other questions in the following manner. In 
response to the first question, Lindsay J. held that it would be inappropriate to talk of 
“investment schemes” especially when no real definition had been given to that term in the 
SPIP. The Judge proceeded to answer the question by reference to the question of what 
trusts the assets of SPIP (other than the non-invested no.2 account funds) were held 
under. In doing so Lindsay J. identified three possible outcomes. First, that all of the assets 
belonged to one common pool and that all the investors would be entitled on the basis of 
respective contributions. Secondly, that the trustee company held a series of separate 
trusts for each contributor who could be identified with a specific security. Finally, an 
“intermediate solution” where there was a combination of separate trusts as well as 
entitlement to a common pool. Lindsay J. held that where “specific property had been 
allocated as security to specific investors” then separate investment schemes or trusts had 
been created and belonged specifically to those investors. In so far as the remaining assets 
which were not linked to a specific security, Lindsay J. held that they were to be treated as 
belonging to the contributors as collective assets for the purposes of the Financial Services 
Act 1986. According to this Act and the regulations made under it, the funds would have to 
be distributed pari passu, that is rateably.5 This left the question as to how the Prentis no.2 
client account was to be distributed. 
 The rules relating to the mixing of funds in a bank account  
The traditional rule applying to the distribution of mixed funds in a bank account was laid 
out in Devaynes v Noble, otherwise known as the rule in Clayton's Case.6 The rule lays 
down that the first payment into the account is presumed to the first payment out of the 
account, the so called “first in, first out” rule.7 The rule is based on the presumed intentions 
of the person operating the account, but has been described by some commentators as 
“capricious and arbitrary”.8 In *I.C.C.L.R. 291  one American case Judge Learned Hand 
commented on the rule by saying: 
“… to throw all the loss upon one, through the mere chance of his being earlier in time, is 
irrational and arbitrary, and is equally a fiction as the rule in Clayton's case. When the law 
adopts a fiction, it is, or at least it should be, for some purpose of justice. To adopt it here 
is to apportion a common misfortune through a test which has no relation whatever to the 
justice of the case.”9 
In other jurisdictions the rule has been rejected and restricted to appropriate situations.10 
However, despite the criticisms of the rule, the Court of Appeal in Barlow Clowes 
International Ltd v Vaughan11 confirmed the rule but held that it applied subject to a 
contrary intention that could be express or presumed. The facts of Barlow Clowes 
concerned investments by a number of investors in schemes operated by Barlow Clowes 
International Ltd. The money in these schemes had been wrongfully dissipated and the 
question was whether the rule in Clayton's Case applied or whether the money was held 
rateably for the investors. Whilst holding that the rule in Clayton's Case was binding on the 
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Court of Appeal, Woolf L.J. held that here there was a shared misfortune and as such the 
intention of the investors was that the rule did not apply so that the fund should be shared 
rateably.12 On the other hand Dillon L.J. did not think that it would be unjust to apply the 
rule in Clayton's Case. In his view, later investors might well feel that it would be unfair for 
their claims to be ranked rateably with the earlier investors.13 
An alternative solution to the rule in Clayton's Case is the rollingcharge method used in 
North America. This method was considered at length by the Court of Appeal in Barlow 
Clowes and operates on the following basis. Where money has been mixed in an account, 
the beneficiaries should share a loss in proportion to their interest in the account 
immediately before each withdrawal. Woolf L.J. described the rule by commenting that it 
was a solution whereby: 
“… credits to a bank account made at different times and from different sources are treated 
as a blend or cocktail with the result that when a withdrawal is made from the account it is 
treated as a withdrawal in the same proportions as the different interests in the account 
(here of the investors) bear to each other at the moment before the withdrawal is 
made.”14 
Although the rolling-charge method does appear to be a much fairer solution to the 
distribution of the fund, it is one that is not always practical in the case of large collective 
investments. 
 The decision in Russell-Cooke Trust Co v Prentis 
In deciding how the Prentis no.2 client account should be distributed to the investors, 
Lindsay J., whilst recognising the criticisms of the rule in Clayton's Case, nevertheless held 
that the rule was binding on the court but could be distinguished by the facts of the 
particular case. In particular the rule could be dispensed with where there was an express 
or presumed counter intention that the rule was not intended to apply. In the words of 
Lindsay J. “the modern approach in England has generally not been to challenge the 
binding nature of the rule but rather to permit it to be distinguished by the reference to the 
facts of the particular case”.15 In support of this the judge referred to the Court of Appeal's 
decision in Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Vaughan16 where the rule was not applied 
because it could not have been the intention of the investors that this would have been the 
contemplated way in which the funds would be distributed in the *I.C.C.L.R. 292  event of 
the collapse of the investment scheme. Certainly a distribution which would do no justice 
on the facts of that case. 
On the facts of Russell-Cooke Trust v Prentis Lindsay J. found that there was significant 
evidence that the rule in Clayton's Case was not intended to apply. In particular the facts 
illustrated that the payments made into the account were not always paid out in the same 
sequence. The allocation of money from the account was completely out of sequence with 
the payments made into the account. In the words of Lindsay J.: 
“… whilst the brochures (given to the investors under the SPIP) made it plain that 
investments might be combined, nothing indicated combinations would be made up in a 
strict temporal sequence … It is, as I see it, one thing to apply a ‘first in, first out’, rule 
where it might have been expected or intended by the investors to be applied and where 
nothing is known inconsistent with its being so expected or intended but quite another to 
presume it to be an intention where both a reasonable contemplation of what was intended 
and the known facts can be seen to be inconsistent with it.” 
As regards the North American rolling-charge method, the court did not feel the need to 
consider it, as the rule in Clayton's Case did not apply on the facts. The rolling charge was 
only an alternative means of distribution which would do more justice on the facts as 
compared with the “first in, first out” method. Lindsay J. did, however, comment that the 
rolling-charge method was in any event very complicated and expensive to apply in a 
situation where there were many investors and the payments into and out of the account 
were made without much temporal sequence. 
 Conclusion  
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Unlike some other jurisdiction, English law has yet to decide the fate of the rule in Clayton's 
Case. Whilst recognising the injustices that can arise from a system of “first in, first out”, 
English law continues to hold good the rule yet adopts a rather different test in its 
application to given factual situations. The approach suggested both in the Court of 
Appeal's decision in Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Vaughan17 and in the High Court in 
Russell-Cooke Trust Co v Prentis is to distinguish the rule by particular reference to the 
facts of a given case. In both of these cases, where investors had pooled their investments, 
nothing on the facts could have suggested that the equitable solution in the distribution of 
the remaining funds after the collapse of the investment scheme was intended to be on the 
basis of a “first in, first out” method. 
Whilst the decision in Russell-Cooke Trust Co v Prentis is a sensible and practicable one on 
the facts of the case, there are some who may argue whether the rule in Clayton's Case is 
simply an unnecessary point of law which has no significance in the modern law. Although 
the rule has not been applied to large investment schemes where it would produce an 
unfair and inequitable outcome in the distribution of funds remaining in a current account, 
the same result is achieved in a current account with a small number of investors or 
beneficiaries. Some commentators have argued that the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Vaughan18 : “… amounted to a strong entreaty to the 
House of Lords to consider the rule and its continuing application in the law.”19 For the 
meantime the rule in Clayton's Case remains good law, only to be quickly dispensed with 
when the facts do not contemplate its application. 
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